The rabbit is out
of the hat: Shell Plc (who I will refer to as Shell global) is selling its
stake in Shell Pakistan Limited. Shell global’s exit from Pakistan has been the
talk of the town. Much has been said about it. Some have said that the exit is
bad for Pakistan’s image – shows foreign investors that business confidence is
low. Others have said the exit is good for Pakistan as it might prevent outflow
of dollars through profit repatriation. Although that would only be the case if
a local company purchases Shell global’s stake.
But what about the
elephant in the room: Shell Pakistan’s valuation? And why does it matter for minority
shareholders?
As per SECP law,
in the event of a substantial acquisition, the acquiring company has to make a
public offer as well. In other words, it must also offer to purchase shares
from minority or free-float shareholders. The minimum offer price for this is
the highest among:
(a) weighted
average price of stock purchase agreement (SPA)
(b) highest price
paid by acquirer for shares of target company in the past six months prior to
public announcement of offer
(c) weighted
average share price of target company in the past six months prior to
announcement of public offer
(d) weighted
average share price of target company in the four weeks prior to public
announcement of intention
(e) book value per
share
Now, the book
value per share is Rs 46 while weighted average share prices (over any period)
are much higher. So, option (e) can be cancelled out. Meanwhile, no potential
buyer has bought shares of Shell Pakistan so option (b) can also be ticked off.
This leaves three options.
Among these,
option (a) is likely to be the minimum offer price since the market value of
Shell Pakistan shares are still far below a potential acquiring price. So, this
leads us onto the big question: what value can we put on Shell Pakistan?
In the event of an
acquisition, the acquirer can value the target company in different ways.
Firstly, it can choose to pay attention to book value. Book value is simply the
accounting method of valuing equity. However, it can be highly outdated since
assets purchased are valued at cost minus depreciation. This is very much the
case for Shell Pakistan as well since Shell’s most valuable assets (land, an
appreciating asset) were purchased decades ago and have been valued at cost as
opposed to market value.
Secondly, the
acquirer can choose discounted cash flows (DCF) as a method of valuation. DCF
is generally a good valuation tool, but it relies heavily on a good prediction of
future cash flows. In the case of oil marketing companies in general, future
cash flows are uncertain due to the transition to renewables (hard to estimate
terminal value). In the Pakistani context, margins are fixed by the regulator
making it even tougher to predict FCFs. You can take assumptions to arrive at a
DCF value, but it could be wildly optimistic or pessimistic depending on the
assumptions taken. Thus, it would be a poor measure of value (easily
manipulated).
There are other
methods as well such as multiples valuation (revenue multiples as an example)
or relative valuation, but they’re generally not used to value a large, long-term
investment like Shell Pakistan’s business. This leaves us with the valuation
technique I’ve used: net asset value.
Net asset value is
calculated by taking the market value of assets and netting off liabilities. It
is simply taking book values and updating them with market values to arrive at
an estimate of the company’s equity. This is the best approach to valuing Shell
Pakistan because much of its valuable assets (land) are in prime locations and
can be sold or converted into other ventures readily. Also, net asset value is
a good valuation indicator since Shell Pakistan used to be wildly profitable in the
past. One could argue that with a change of management direction, Shell
Pakistan’s assets could be used more profitably (unlocking greater value).
I have calculated
a conservative estimate of Shell’s value based on this method here. The major point of contention would be land
valuation. The land was valued using Zameen.com’s index tool. Commercial
property rates were used if they could be found. If they could not be found,
general plot rates were used. If no data was available on a location, values
from a neighboring location were used. For instance, no value was available for
Keamari industrial/commercial land, hence plot rates from Clifton Block 1
(located next to Keamari) were used.
It must be
highlighted that the land valuation could be inaccurate. For example, Shell’s
Marine Drive petrol pump land was valued at PKR 1.4 billion. But when I called
a real estate broker in Karachi, he gave a rough estimate of 175 crore (1.75
bn) rupees for the same property. Since my aim was to be conservative in the
valuation, I applied a 20% margin of error on the land value. Although, to get a
precise estimate of Shell’s land, one would have to make use of property
brokers and land appraisers from across Pakistan.
Similarly, I
applied a 20% margin of safety or discount on Shell’s net value. This was done
to accommodate the fact that Pakistan has a tough business environment
currently with huge hurdles in profit repatriation. Meanwhile, global interest
rates are high and global liquidity is constrained so a potential acquirer
might be willing to pay less for Shell Pakistan.
Based on this
valuation, Shell’s price per share would be 177 rupees. This imputes a
market capitalization of 37.9 billion rupees ($131.9 million). So, Shell
global’s stake in Shell Pakistan would be worth $101.9 million.
However, Shell’s
ultimate SPA price might be wildly different. This is because acquisitions are
very much about supply-demand. If there are several potential acquirers
vying for a piece of Shell Pakistan, then Shell might be valued much higher
than this. But the converse could be true too.
For shareholders
of Shell Pakistan, it’s a waiting game now. But the good thing is that the wait
might not be too long.
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